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P R O C E E D I N G S

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 2020

P.M. SESSION

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THE CLERK: Calling the matter of Kiel versus the Regents of the University of California, case number H 20072843.

And plaintiff's counsel would you please state your appearances.

MR. JAFFE: Richard Jaffe for the plaintiffs.

THE CLERK: Thank you.

And defendant's counsel.

MS. CHUN: Marissa Chun and Kristin Madigan for Crowell and Moring for the Regents of the University of California and Michael Drake.

And your Honor, if I may, I would like to introduce my cocounsel Katharine Essick of the University of California.

And I believe we also have joining us Rachel Nosowsky and Margaret Wu of the University of California General Counsel's Office.

THE COURT: Good afternoon to all of you.

THE CLERK: Thank you.

And I see a Suzanne Rose.

MS. CHUN: Yes. My colleagues and Rody (ph) may be joining us by phone as well as an observer.

THE CLERK: And what's Michael's last name?

MS. CHUN: I believe it was Margaret Wu, W U.

THE CLERK: Okay. No. I have Margaret, but I thought you said someone after Kristin. I thought you said Michael.

MR. JAFFE: Michael Drake?

MS. CHUN: Oh, Michael Drake is a defendant.

THE CLERK: Got it.

MS. ESSICK: Okay. This is Katharine Essick that deputy general counsel Margaret Wu is not here.

THE CLERK: Okay. Thank you.

THE COURT: Good afternoon to all of you.

First let me start with my apologies that because of largely the pandemic as everybody knows this hearing date has been moved a couple of times both forward and back frankly it was also -- there are, as everybody knows, a lot of papers. I wanted to make sure that I was fully conversant and familiar with the papers that have been filed.

Let me also start out, I have not issued a tentative ruling but instead have asked that parties appear. But I wanted to give you my preliminary thoughts orally in part because I think that helps focus

the hearing.

Obviously a large point of the hearing is for me to hear arguments of counsel. On the other hand I don't want to just have random arguments of counsel. I would like arguments that focus on the issues that I think are important. And the only way to do that is for me to take a little bit of time to identify the issues that I think are important.

We're obviously here on a motion for preliminary injunction brought at least the first names, plaintiffs, is Cindy Kiel who is executive associate vice chancellor at UC Davis, and I guess she is a lawyer by education. She provides leadership and research regarding compliance at UC Davis there are two students, one at UCSB, one at UCLA, and an employee of the Fresno satellite UCSF as well as UCLA law proper.

The remedy plaintiffs seek based on the plaintiff's proposed order that was submitted is to enjoin the UC registration and its current president, Michael Drake, from enforcing the executive order first issued by a former president Janet Napolitano but was issued on her last day of office in office on July 31st, 2020 and later modified by now President Drake.

The executive order mandated that, quote, all students, faculty, and staff I think synonymous with

employees who are quote living, learning, or working at any UC location must receive a flu vaccine.

The papers indicate that there are approximately 510,000 members of the UC community that will be effected by the executive order. The original executive order was to have a flu vaccine requirement effective as of November 1st. That date wound up in effect being changed by this proceeding that they got moved around. UC committed that they wouldn't enforce the order until an order was issued in this case.

There are now both medical and religious exemptions for the requirement for all three groups faculties, students, and employees.

The plaintiffs argue that the executive order is ultra vires. Beyond former President Napolitano's authority, and perhaps more importantly violate various constitutional requirements including the due process clause, the equal protection clause, and as well as constitutional right to privacy.

Plaintiffs have argued that the flu vaccine has not been proven to be sufficiently safe and effective to support such a mandate, and the decision to get a flu shot should be left to individuals.

The plaintiffs rely, it seems, to be primarily on the Jacobson versus Massachusetts case, a US Supreme

Court case, to argue that the vaccine mandate or any government mandate that infringes personal liberty and bodily integrity must have a real and substantial connection to public health. I think that's pretty much a direct quote from the complaint, the amended complaint.

Both parties have submitted substantial declarations by medical and public health experts regarding their opinions of the executive order.

Probably obvious on a preliminary injunction the Court's required to focus on two primary issues:

First, whether the plaintiffs have met the burden of showing the probability of success on the merits:

And secondarily, the Court's required to do an analysis, the balance of the harms, of either issuing the injunction or not issuing the injunction with that preliminary background.

Let me describe my preliminary views.

That is that plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits and have not shown that the balance of harms leads towards issuing a preliminary injunction.

As a result I'm inclined to deny the motion. Here's why:

First, I'm not persuaded that President
Napolitano's executive order was beyond her authority.
Bylaw 30 says only that the president is, quote,
expected to consult with the academic senate, close
quote and on issues significant to the general welfare
and conduct of the faculty.

It says expected to consult, not required to consult. And whether it's legislation or orders like this, it seems to me it's not difficult to use a mandatory term if mandatory is what's required.

Second, former President Napolitano's declaration says she was familiar with her attorney, and of course she's held many positions of government authority, including being president of the university; and that, in fact, based on her familiarity with the rules of the university, that it was she who was the decision-maker.

And she was not required to formerly consult with the academic senate. Although she knows in her declaration that in fact before issuing the executive order she did consult with many members of the faculty, particularly those who were in the medical or public health areas.

I don't know -- I find, Mr. Jaffe, you undoubtedly may want this, the suggestion that you try

to do an end run around the academic senate is to some extent also negated by the fact that she corrected the provost and executive vice president to immediately consult with the academic senate regarding the implementation of the order.

And I realize that that's not before the order was issued, but it seems to me that if somebody is acting beyond the scope of their authority and trying to do an end run around the academic senate. It's a little strange to have actually in the executive order that one of the first things to be done, and of course she wasn't -- I assume that the reason that she designated the provost and executive vice president to immediately consult with the academic senate is because she issued it on her last day in her position as president of the university.

She wasn't going to be there afterwards, so I mean, maybe she just thought it more appropriate to delegate it.

But that also seems to me to help support what at least I infer sometimes when people act in my experience ultra vires they're trying to acquire or misappropriate power to themselves.

This was President Napolitano's last day in office. It's very clear she wasn't trying to kind of

build up her own power base. She was out of office the very next day.

Third, the standing order 100.4 A supports her authority because it provides that the president, quote, shall have full authority and responsibility over the separation of all affairs and operations of the university subject to exclusions, although the exclusions aren't relevant here.

And fourth and last, and in some ways most compelling, the UC Regents are parties to this case, and indeed the UC Regents are taking the position that President Napolitano, in fact, was acting within the scope of authority that had been delegated to her by the Regents.

And of course, the Regents, the university is an arm of the state. I think there's no question the Regents had the authority to delegate, and frankly, I think if the Regents felt that President Napolitano was acting outside the scope of her authority, the Regents likely would be taking the position different than what's being taken in the case, which is in fact President Napolitano was acting within the scope of her authority.

As to the merits and the application of the Supreme Court's Jacobson case having reviewed all of the

papers it does seem to me that under Jacobson there is a real and substantial connection between the executive order and public health.

It's clear that UC leadership gave substantial thought and consideration for some months informed by the highly trained and credentialed medical and public health experts both within the UC system and outside the UC system.

It's also clear, as plaintiffs contend, that the executive order was prompted by the Covid 19 pandemic.

But contrary to what plaintiffs argue, it seems clear to me even including the face of the executive order that it was not just about the possibility of the shortage of hospital beds.

I know plaintiffs have tried to link the sole justification for the executive order to the shortage of hospital beds, but I don't think that's a fair reading of the executive order or the facts that are set forth in declarations in support of the opposition, probably most particularly I think it's Dr. Bottington (ph), and it indeed it seems to me in review of the declaration it's abundantly clear that the executive order among other things keep the individuals who would be required to get a flu vaccine safe and to keep the overall UC

community safe.

Seems to be it wasn't an arbitrary and/or capricious decision. Rather it was well thought out and supported by ample if not overwhelming medical opinions.

And as a result, in my view, and again this is the kind of my oral tentative, but I think I'm pretty firm in this because I've read all the papers, plaintiffs have not proven that they're likely to prevail. And based on the medical opinions presented on balance, I'm persuaded that the UC community is collectively safer with a flu mandate than if there were no flu mandate.

Here are some additional facts that weigh heavily in my mind.

First, the UC expert opinions in my view are more persuasive and provided by experts with more thorough training and expertise than the plaintiff's experts. Moreover, their opinions are in line with all of the national and state public health experts.

I mean, notably the CDC is very clear that they recommend -- and this is a quote -- annual flu vaccination is recommended for everyone six months of age or older with rare exceptions because it is an effective way to decrease flu illnesses, hospitalizations and deaths.

And from the papers -- I didn't previously know this. I did know that the CDC advocates a flu vaccines and frankly encouraged people to get flu vaccines generally this year because of the pandemic in particular, but apparently the CDC has been more vigorously advocating the use of flu vaccines for at least the last ten years.

And specifically the CDC states that it's particularly important to get an annual flu shot this year during the Covid 19 pandemic because it's better for the individual, it's better for the community, and it helps to preserve hospital and health care capacity, includes burdens on, it seems to me, doctors, health care workers, hospitals, ICU beds, and perhaps ventilators.

A bit of an aside, plaintiffs expert Professor Normer from UC Irvine quotes Doctor Fauci in a way that I found frankly a little bit misleading. I mean, it caught my attention when he quoted Doctor Fauci who, of course, is in the news quite a bit now, and the quote is something like that, Doctor Fauci said that he wouldn't feel comfortable unless and until a vaccine was proven to be safe and effective. The only problem, and Professor Normer quote, doesn't say this, Doctor Fauci was talking about a vaccine that has not yet been

developed. He was talking about the Covid 19 vaccine, which of course has been the subject of a lot of both medical and political discourse as to whether, you know, the Covid 19 vaccine was being rushed so that it wouldn't be sufficiently tested to be sure that it was safe and effective.

Doctor Fauci was not talking about the flu vaccine which has been used for decades. I realize that plaintiffs have made the argument that the flu vaccine hasn't been tested in controlled studies. I understand that. But it seems to me, one, it can't, and two, it's not necessary.

I mean, at this point, the flu vaccine has developed, and I realize the strains differ, the effectiveness differs, I know from the papers that I guess 20 years ago -- I think it was in 1989 -- there was a problem where, at least the plaintiff's papers suggest, that there was -- I think the term they used was negative efficacy, that somehow the flu vaccine that year may have been worse.

I don't think UC's experts addressed that, but in my mind, I'm not sure that makes any difference. It seems to me on both the national and state level and indeed not only does the CDC recommend annual flu vaccines, the California Department of Health and -- in

fact, within the papers you may know that the current California Department of Health officer is the former Alameda County health officer, and she strongly recommends the flu vaccine particularly because the Covid 19 pandemic.

And then getting into some of the other areas, it's also clear that some vaccines, and I think the example that comes first to mind is small pox, which was a vaccine that was issued in Jacobson, had been routinely required for elementary and high school aged children for many, many years.

And indeed in doing research on this, and I would like counsel to address this, there's an opinion Love versus State Department of Education, which was issued in November 2018. So only two years ago. It was out of the third district, Mr. Jaffe, where your offices are.

And the Court of Appeal in that case found that the immunization requirements for public and private school children and childcare facilities passed constitutional muster notwithstanding the fact that there was no personal belief exemption.

And in that case, the Third District Court of Appeal addressed, I believe, all of the constitutional elements that are raised in this case, and under Auto

Equity Sales, frankly, I would -- I would -- I believe I would make this determination anyway, but because of Auto Equity Sales and the requirement that I follow Court of Appeal decisions, frankly, it's not clear to me that I even have discretion to do anything other than what I'm already inclined to do.

And again, I believe that that case addresses all of the constitutional arguments that are raised in this case.

Yet another concern, at least to my knowledge and this I think is largely supported by the declarations, all vaccines have somewhat limited effectiveness. It's not -- they're not effective for everybody, and in turn I think most if not all vaccines sometimes have adverse consequences.

And a difficulty that I have -- I'm obviously sitting here as a judge, I'm not a medical expert -- and while it's very clear from the case law that there can be situations where I could issue a preliminary injunction, for example, if it didn't meet the Jacobson standard and an order issued by the president of the university or health officers or even the governor violated a constitutional requirement and that there was no real and substantial connection to public health, I would be required to strike it down. But I don't

believe that that's the case here.

Another point that I think is significant is it's clear the executive order is a mandate but it's also clear it's qualified.

First, while there's much discussion about 510,000 people would be effected in the UC community, we all know that virtually all of us, including me, I'm sitting in my dining room which has been kind of converted to a courtroom, are working from home and virtually everybody is working remotely.

And I believe that's also true for virtually all UC faculty, students, and employees. I realize that within that group there are some who probably must be on campus. But of the 510,000, and I have not seen numbers, in the papers, but intuitively it seems to me that likely a very, very small percentage of the 510,000 who are described as being in the UC community in fact in the words of the executive order live, work, or study on campus and the mandate is only for those who are on campus.

And frankly, the other thing is it's not clear to me, and I realize the university is obviously a public institution and operates on public property, but almost totally independent of the -- my view of the Jacobson case and the Love versus State Department of

Education, it's not clear to me that the owner of the property can't condition entry on to property particularly when there are health considerations as UC has done.

The limits of the mandate really are triggered. Not everybody within the community needs to get the flu vaccine, only those people who are on a UC campus or UC property need to get the flu vaccine. And of course it's qualified because there are medical and religious exemptions.

I think that's the extent of my preliminary comments. So once again, I'm inclined strongly to deny the preliminary injunction for those reasons. It seems to me it passes constitutional muster and President Napolitano's executive order in my view does not -- is not an ultra vires act.

So Mr. Jaffe, it seems to me likely you should start. Make whatever points. And to the extent you think I've got it wrong, I'm all ears and want to hear if you think I've missed anything important.

And actually, I did miss something that I thought was important. And at some point in the plaintiff's papers, there was reference to something like that, if I were to uphold, which really means deny the preliminary injunction, this would be the first time

in American jurisprudence that a vaccine that was disconnected with the actual health emergency would be upheld. I don't know whether that's true. Frankly, put in that way, in my view, I'm not even sure that's terribly relevant.

Ms. Chun's declaration is that by my count at the time the declaration was prepared and there may be more now, but there were at least 20 universities, public and private, throughout the nation who had flu vaccine requirements that certainly seemed to me based on the materials that were submitted are virtually identical to what UC has done.

Now, the UC executive order is much more detailed and much more supported and substantiated than the material attached in the declaration.

I don't know what other schools did before issuing the requirements that they issued, but many of them are very prestigious institutions, Johns Hopkins, Columbia, University of North Carolina. And again, I think there are like 20 universities that have done that, and, of course, those would be the universities that have done it at the time that Ms. Chun prepared her declaration. There may be more.

But this is certainly not the first time that a

university like the University of California has made the public health decision that a flu vaccine was required for the protection of the individuals, the protection of the university community, and to avoid taxing the health care system.

And I'm sorry. Please proceed, Mr. Jaffe. And again, if you think I have anything wrong or you think I've missed something or if you think I'm thinking about this in the wrong way, please let me know.

I would like both counsel to address whether they feel Love versus State Department of Education, the 2018 opinion out of the Third District somehow is not controlling here.

MR. JAFFE: Okay. Judge, first thing I want to say, thank you so much. We on behalf of plaintiffs and the people that are opposed to the flu vaccine, I want to express my appreciation for how you've handled the case.

You moved it back into October because of circumstances. You know, we continued. You issued a tentative decision which in effect tried to create a standstill agreement based in part on

Ms. Chun's gracious attempt to delay this. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you for the attention that you have shown to this case. I think it was greatly appreciated

by the members of the community, by those who were opposed to that. And I think that's -- you know, that's something and I think -- and I wanted to point that out.

The second thing I would like to say, and I appreciate how much paper there was in the case, and there was a lot of paper, and certainly the attention that you gave it is praiseworthy.

Just a quick point on the other universities. I think there were 21 universities mentioned and maybe there are a few more now, and I would like to point out that there are 5300 colleges and universities in the United States, and we now have evidence that .4 percent have issued the flu order and we have no evidence that 99.6 percent of all the universities in the entire country have issued the flu order. So you know, you can make statistics talk about anything you want to prove. And I have no idea what the 99.6 number represents, but all I wanted to give is some context of what this 21 reflects, notwithstanding as Ms. Chun pointed out to me it includes my alma mater, Columbia.

So that being said, I'm not sure what we can derive from the fact that 99.6 percent haven't. There's no evidence that they have a new mandate.

THE COURT: So let me respond.

One, thank you for the thank you. Frankly I

think it's an interesting case. It's interesting issues. One of the reasons why I'm in this position, it's an opportunity to learn from very highly experienced experts.

Let me also say, I don't doubt the good faith concerns that your clients have. It's just, you know, when I balance it, it seems to me that under the case law, the community interests outweigh their individual interests.

I also take your point that in some ways, yes, maybe there are only 20 or 21 universities. On the other hand, as I commented and I'll be candid, because we're in the middle of the pandemic, I routinely, in fact I have a link in my iPad to Johns Hopkins because they have the most sophisticated analysis of the data. And you're right, but this isn't an election. It's not whether 99 percent -- and you know, I don't know the extent to which Ms. Chun or people who were working with her were able to get all universities, but it isn't by numbers.

I was effected by the fact that many very prestigious universities made decisions exactly in line with what the University of California has done.

MR. JAFFE: Thank you, Judge.

The other point I would like to make on that

is, because of this case, I've been getting a lot of emails from people that want me to do the same thing at other universities, including my alma mater. And I have to tell you, my view is that this argument mostly works or almost exclusively works with public universities because of the Constitution.

I mean, I don't think there is a -- if this were a private university, I'm not sure you and I would be having this conversation. Because the Fifth Amendment, you know -- unless they're getting, you know, state funding or something, I'm not sure that applies.

So from -- like I say, I chose this case because it was -- because they have something called the Constitution, and it applies to the state action.

So again, there are different considerations in a private university versus public. And again, I mean, I think that's one of the reasons -- well, that's the reason, while I haven't filed against my alma mater because I don't think the constitutional claim applies, otherwise I would be very happy to go back to law school and serve them. But that's not going to happen.

So that being said, I understand the point. And certainly there are universities that have taken that position.

The most important thing I have to say about

that is the fact that the three of us, Ms. Chun, you, and I are dealing with the first time this issue has come up in court during the pandemic, right?

And I could tell you another thing. I've been asked to file in Massachusetts too because -Ms. Chun talked about Massachusetts -- the state of
Massachusetts has issued an order for six month old kids to 30 year old students, but --

THE COURT: I saw that.

familiar with this.

MR. JAFFE: You saw that.

THE COURT: I think that's the difference between my 20 and your 21.

MR. JAFFE: Right. I think that's right.

THE COURT: That is the next --

MR. JAFFE: And the thing about that,

Massachusetts is -- it doesn't apply to employees and

faculty, and in my mind, that is really the critical

difference between this case, and, oh, it's not only

Love. Love, I believe, is one of the three or four

lawsuits that were brought after California changed the

vaccine exemption law, and it removed -- you might be

In 2015, they removed the personal belief exemption from California law. Before, there was no religious exemption. Before you could just declare that

you have a personal belief against vaccines in 2015.

They changed the law because of this -supposedly because of this Disneyland flu thing, measles
thing came up. They changed the law and eliminated the
personal belief exemption, and there were three or four
challenges to that.

One case was cited by Ms. Chun. That would be the *Brown* case. I cited one case which was in Federal Court, Whitlow, and Love I believe was the third case and there was actually one more.

In those cases --

THE COURT: That may have the Love case which cites --

MR. JAFFE: I think that was it.

So all these cases occurred, and there were four of them, and they all held the same thing. They all held that the removal of the personal belief exemption was not unconstitutional citing Jacobson, right, because of the balancing of it. Absolutely positively correct on that.

The reason I don't think that's controlling or any of these cases are controlling is really the critical difference in this case, which is that the last time any high level court has decided that adults -- that there could be a mandate for adults I think was

Jacobson.

What happened in vaccine law is as a result of Jacobson, which -- and the interesting thing of Jacobson, Jacobson is always cited for the proposition you can mandate vaccine law.

But the law in Cambridge said that all adults have to be vaccinated during the course of a small pox epidemic or you had to pay a five dollar fine which is about 140 bucks in our time.

So the Supreme Court upheld that law based on the Jacobson analysis of the real and substantial test, the real and substantial connection between the mandate and the harm, they're trying to stop and that was the last time that I can think of.

And I sort of do this partially for a living so. This is my field. I have five other cases for doctors involving these kinds of things. I don't think there's ever been a case since that for adults.

What has happened is since the 19 -- teens and 20's we've moved the vaccination decision to children. And in -- and that occurred in the early 20's with this Zuncht case, Z U N C H T, which said that -- it's black letter law, Jacobson, right. Jacobson says you can mandate vaccines.

So from Zuncht in the 20's onward, every single

case of mandatory vaccination for children, for school children, in my view has been upheld, which is why my name isn't on any of these cases in California after the removal of the personal belief exemption because -- you know, I'm a lawyer. I mean, I look at the law. I give an opinion to people. A lot of times they don't even like my opinion.

But the fact of the matter is, mandatory vaccination for children has been held to be constitutional in essentially all courts.

The question that hasn't been asked since

Jacobson, and your Honor has the distinct honor to be

the first judge in this country to give an opinion on

this issue, is whether you can do that for adults across

the state, right, whether you can affect, apply

mandatory vaccination to adults. And like I say, I

don't think -- you could look to Jacobson, I suppose,

right. But they had this five dollar alternative where

you pay the fine.

THE COURT: Although, I'll note Jacobson was a criminal prosecution. I mean, it may have been a five dollar fine, but it was a criminal prosecution where the defendant was found guilty. And it was the guilty -- I don't know -- verdict. I assume it was a verdict. It was a guilty verdict and was upheld by the US Supreme

1 Court.

2 MR. JAFFE: Absolutely.

THE COURT: Yes. It was only five dollars, but it was in a criminal context.

MR. JAFFE: Right.

But the point is -- well, it is coercive. But since that time, the law, the jurisprudence, has evolved to basically shunting it all off on children.

And now what's happening here and with all these 21 or other institutions, we're now entering a new phase. And I think it's important, and I think — respectfully, I think you need to address that in your opinion. I think that — and if I'm wrong about this, someone will point this out to me. But I don't think there's been a case since Jacobson that says adults throughout a state have to be vaccinated for a disease that's not related to a pandemic. And Ms. Chun will point out if I'm wrong. And I think that — that is the essence of the case that what you are doing here — look, I'll tell you another —

THE COURT: Hold on. If I can, and I'm sure Ms. Chun will point out if that's wrong, let's assume for the moment that you are right.

The obvious next question is: What difference does it make? Some of it I can anticipate, particularly

in Ms. Kiel's declaration, she makes what I view as kind of a, I don't know, bioethics point about informed consent.

And obviously adults are in a better position to evaluate the risks and the benefits and make an informed decision as to whether they want the benefit of the flu vaccine but with it the risk of adverse consequences. And I get that. And you may be making another point. That's one obvious distinction.

On the other hand, it seems to me that it may not really make a difference because, in fact, parents routinely in -- and my assignment prior to this was family law, so even besides being a parent, I have some family law background.

And it seems to me that indeed parents often, particularly at younger ages, always make decisions for children. And as a result, it's not clear to me that the distinction you made actually makes a difference when analyzing it, particularly in light of the constitutional challenges that you have raised.

MR. JAFFE: Interesting.

So you think that -- so the distinction between an adult and child, you're questioning whether that has any constitutional basis to make that kind of distinction.

THE COURT: That's right. Because -- and I think your point, which makes good sense to me, again, an adult is in the position to make an informed decision about the risks and benefits of getting a vaccine, but in particular here the flu vaccine.

And as we've already discussed in the papers make abundantly obvious vaccines are not ever, I don't think, 100 percent effective, and they almost always present some risk of adverse consequences.

And again, particularly when I read Ms. Kiel's declaration, she makes some arguments that, notwithstanding my tentative oral ruling, have some appeal that everybody should have the right to make decisions about what happens to their body.

Now, I believe that that is -- there are some bounds to that. One of the UC's experts analogized it, and frankly this has always seemed to me to be right, it's a little bit like drunk driving, that an individual may want to drive a car while intoxicated, and while it's good for the individual driver not to be driving while intoxicated, frankly I think far and away the real support for drunk driving laws is the risk of injury to others.

And it's the risk of injury to others that it seems to me weigh heavily in drunk driving. It weighs

heavily in vaccine.

And going back to this adult/child distinction, I understand why an adult is better able to make an informed decision about the risks and benefits of getting a vaccine. But it also seems to me that the same adult, if that adult has a child, is in exactly the same position and would make exactly the same decisions for the child as they would for the adult. And as a result, although it's a distinction, it's not at all clear to me that it makes a difference.

It just makes -- it moves the decision-maker as to whether or not you are in favor or opposed to a vaccine, and let me -- we'll have plenty of time to flush out all of the issues.

Let me ask another question though, and frankly, I'm not familiar with what you described as the Disneyland, I guess, event that happened in 2015 which led to the elimination of the person belief exemption which I guess otherwise I guess had been required by California law.

While I think I'm pretty firm about my tentative decision not to issue a preliminary injunction, it does seem to me that a personal belief exemption would provide a little bit of an escape valve for people who -- and I think I said this earlier -- I

don't doubt the good faith belief of your clients. And frankly I've also read the papers and I realized there may be -- I don't remember exactly how it was described -- but vaccine hesitancy, if you force too many people, you may wind up getting push-back. While as a matter of law it's my belief a personal belief exemption is not required. It has occurred to me that a personal belief exemption, as long as it can be addressed in a way that's tight enough, might sort of act as sort of a meliorative effect so that the university or if it's another government agency doesn't come across as too heavy-handed. Again, that's a total aside.

I don't think -- in my mind, that's not a legal issue. I think legally that when I look at the probability of success on the merits and the balance of harm, it seems clear to me that this executive order is constitutional.

As a matter -- it's not really politics but with human interaction, I do sort of wonder whether it might not kind of go down more easily if there was a personal belief exemption to the executive order. But that's a totally fortuitous comment.

MR. JAFFE: Right.

THE COURT: Sorry. I interrupted you.

MR. JAFFE: You know, as you were listening --

as I was listening to your order, you know, I think what -- you know, the real issue, the fundamental issue here is that -- we think as a matter of fact what happened was when the contact tracing and tracking committee met they kicked us around and they decided that we were not going to make it a mandate. It was going to be a recommendation. And I think the real heart of the case is a recommendation, a strong recommendation versus a mandate and the way that you're looking at it is mandate with personal belief exemption which is sort of the same thing operatively, you know whether you can opt out or whether you start by recommendation. So it's interesting that we're approaching the same problem with the same remedy from a little different angle.

And the problem is under the law you have a -under the mandate you have the medical exemption which
is not very effective. I mean, it's basically
anaphylactic shock for the treatment.

The way the medical exemption works, you really have to prove -- basically dropping dead from the flu vaccine before anything else. Autoimmune doesn't really count.

And then you have this -- it's not really religious. It's not really -- just to correct the

record, your Honor. It's not a religious exception.

It's an accommodation. And the difference is a medical exception presumably doesn't require anything. But a religious accommodation is really a -- basically requires a mask.

And by the way, under California law, even if -- state hospitals, what you have to do during flu season, there is a requirement for a flu vaccine but you can avoid that by wearing a mask. The irony is the UC is requiring students, professors, employees that have no contact with the health care system, they have more stringent requirements than California law imposes on health care workers.

So literally in hospitals you could just wear a mask, right. And that's good enough to be around sick people and that's by statute, right.

But if you're in a university setting and you step foot on the campus you got to get the shot. And I'm wondering why, why the University of California feels that they need to protect the entire community more than the patients in hospitals, that they need to protect the sick patients in hospitals.

So you know, the answer is an additional layer of protection, right. But that layer of protection -- you know, let's -- I don't know -- we were dealing with

this case -- the good and the bad news about this case is that we're dealing with this in real time.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. JAFFE: Right? And for better and worse we filed these papers a hundred years ago back in August.

And we filed an injunction papers mid-September. I don't know just if we -- certain facts just permeate.

Like, for example -- I don't know if you saw on Yahoo. They're having a problem with the flu vaccine in South Korea. A dozen people dropped dead. Two dozen people dropped dead. Now it's up to 60 people dropped dead after taking the flu shot.

Now, South Korea is still mandating the flu shot because they're saying it's unrelated. Singapore next door has stopped.

Now that probably would never happen here because our health care system is much better than South Korea's, except for what's happening in Covid.

But it underscores the fact that what you are talking about is a medical intervention, and you are talking about compulsory medical intervention, which has consequences.

And ultimately the thing that I -- I think I understand how a judge in a way has to be persuaded by the CDC and all the august experts who work for Bill

Gates and who are in charge of the vaccine policy. I totally get that why any case like this has to be an uphill battle.

But the one fact that I think predominates over everything is we are experiencing one in a hundred year event, right?

So the notion that august though they may be, a bunch of infectious disease experts can give their personal opinion based on their personal observations of authority and try to assuage, you know, what should be your concerns that the circumstances, the current circumstances are going to be such that the vaccine won't cause more harm than good, I find that troubling.

I think as lawyers, you know, maybe we got to look at this in terms of burden of proof. And that's what we talked about in the papers.

I would suggest to you that because of a one in a hundred year event, right -- I wish I could prove to you that the vaccine, the flu vaccine will cause more harm than good because of Covid 19. I can't do that, right. We don't have the data yet.

But the reality is they can't prove it's safe now. All they can do is extrapolate from a non-pandemic situation to a pandemic situation and say: Trust me. We're authorities. We're telling you it's safe.

Now, here's what we know, right, we know there is a phenomenon, an absolute proven phenomenon, you could call it virus interference, you could call it pathogenic priming, you could call it negative efficacy what is a scientific fact is that some vaccines cause more harm than good because of -- molecularly it's pathogenic priming, from a micro level, it's virus interference. We know that. That's established.

What happened in January 2029 some obscure scientist at DOD wrote this paper, and they compared people that got the flu vaccine to people who didn't get the flu vaccine and by and large he said that he found mixed results. This is this Wolf study.

Now, it's only an observational study but what he found is to the good. He found that the flu vaccine protected people from related conditions, related infections. And that's to the good.

Related to the bad he found that the flu vaccine was associated, strongly associated with an increase risk, 36 percent of contracting what was then common Corona virus vaccine. That's a finding.

What does that mean in terms of proof?

Honestly, it doesn't mean much. It is suggestive of the fact that the viral interference pathogenic priming or however other you want to call it might cause more harm

than good. Nobody knows the answer to that.

THE COURT: So I hear you. I also -- going to an earlier point, there's no doubt in my mind the burden of proof rests on you under burden of proof or preliminary injunction. The plaintiff needs to prove the likelihood of success on the merits. So I don't think there is an issue about burden of proof.

We also know that Wolf wrote a letter saying this study should not be interpreted as one discouraging the taking of the flu vaccine, and he wrote that obviously in the context of the Covid 19 pandemic so.

And the viral interference that he was talking about was Corona virus but not the novel Corona virus. We're now dealing with, Covid 19.

MR. JAFFE: Correct.

And indeed to my credit, I will say, I pointed out right in the complaint about the letter. We're not hiding the ball here.

And look, I mean, the reality is that was done -- the article, peer reviewed though it was, was done before the pandemic, and there are politics here, which we can't really get into, but that is absolutely true, right? It is suggested, right. And that's the problem.

Let me just -- I think -- let me clear up what

I think is a confusion. I misspoke when I said burden of proof. The burden of proof -- obviously we have the burden of proof like success of the merits. I'm talking about a different burden of proof in effect by analogy, right. I'm talking about the medical issue, right. In other words when we talk about a flu vaccine in the context -- we're not having this conversation -- we would be having a different case last year, right. Suppose we -- what we're talking about whether they can mandate, the flu vaccine, apart from the pandemic.

THE COURT: I've pondered that too. I think that they probably could. I mean, there's no question that former President Napolitano's executive order was -- I don't know if triggered is the right word, but what motivated it was the Covid 19 pandemic.

But frankly, I tend to think that UC or other government agencies could do it even without that. And of course, the other part about -- there was some talk in the papers about quindemics, and we do know that medically people who are in -- I think the term -- I may be misusing -- this co morbidity --

MR. JAFFE: Co-morbidity, right.

THE COURT: -- or other health issues are more susceptible to Covid 19.

I think it's probably fair to infer that if you

have the flu you may be more susceptible to Covid 19. I gather we don't have a medical answer to that.

But I have pondered and tend to think that UC could have done this last year before the pandemic started, and that's somewhat consistent with what -- at least I take from the papers that since at least 2010 there has been increasing encouragement by the CDC to have the flu vaccine widely taken by the public.

MR. JAFFE: You know, Judge, the thing I was going to tell you, I think as I look at it as a litigator, I think a new mandate without the -- I think I agree with you in the sense that if there was no pandemic, I think it would be more palatable because then you could just -- I think that that would better support -- it would better support their experts about -- and their expertise and their experience.

The problem I have is that the pandemic throws a monkey wrench into things. The wolf study, qualified as it may be, is certainly suggestive that there could be a virus interference? There are other studies that show to different subsets like pregnant women and children that it's going to have a negative effect, and I really think the heart of our argument is that -- and the heart of the medical argument is and why I don't think you should rely so much on their experts is that

none of them have any experience with the 1918 Spanish flu because they weren't around there.

And we're dealing with a completely new issue. And we may know, I suspect in two or three or four years, we are going to know whether the flu shot has helped or killed more people. We just don't know that now.

And I think in essence -- in essence our argument is that given the pandemic and given the lack of data, right, you could strongly recommend the flu shot but you can't force people to take it given what we don't know in the context of the pandemic. And that is consistent with your inclination that but for the pandemic they might be able to do it.

Because what we're really saying is you can't make people -- turn people involuntarily into human * guinea pigs.

We know that there's this issue of vaccine interference, and nobody can tell you that it's not going to cause more harm than good. They could think — they could say anything they want, talk about argument by authority, but they can't prove it and in science they typically want to have proof.

Now, where is the proof that this flu shot won't kill 5,000 people in the UC communities? How can

they prove that? How do you know? South Korea, 60 people got killed. How do you know? And if you don't know and you can't prove it, then what these experts are talking about is not science. It's their religious beliefs or their faith in vaccines, and that's really it.

How can you force people in this kind of circumstance to accept authority and hope for the best, which is essentially what they're doing, and just because the CDC says so and 21.4 percent of the universities do it.

That's what I got. You know, if it doesn't convince you, it doesn't convince you.

THE COURT: You know, I view my role -- I mean I'm not making the decision that this is the right medical decision, UC's medical -- well, their leadership team assisted by their medical experts have made that decision.

In my view my role is to provide guardrails to make sure that the decision that they've made fits within the guardrails set up by the Constitution.

I mean, you know as a lawyer by training and I'm a lawyer by training, we read a lot of expert declarations. Sometimes have expert testimony. You know evaluate it. But I'm not sitting as a trier of

fact in my view in this instance. Now, it happens I do -- and maybe to some extent I am.

As I indicated earlier, I do find the UC experts to be better credentialed, more experienced, and maybe even more to the point a little bit on both sides. Some of the statements in the declarations were a little conclusory. But the UC declarations were better supported in my view by evidence.

It's not perfect. Life isn't perfect. Science isn't perfect. As you say, we're going to learn more about this later, and you may be right.

But again, at least in my view, my role is just to make sure that the UC hasn't gone outside the guardrails in the Constitution.

And based on my review of the expert declarations and what the UC experts have said, the weight of the authority in my mind is that the decision was certainly rational. It certainly wasn't arbitrary and under the -- it meets the Jacobson standard.

And it seems to me that's the limit of my role. I'm not really making the decision as to whether from a medical standpoint this is better or not. I'm making the decision as to whether this violates the Constitution, and I believe that under all the cases together with the evidence that's been provided, it

doesn't violate the Constitution.

Separately, as I raised earlier, I do tend to think that a personal belief exemption, if one could be formulated, may make this go down more easily. I mean UC may still get, I don't know, but -- you know, 70, 80 percent of what's described as the UC community may get the vaccine. If that's true, the public health goal is probably largely accomplished.

But from a legal standpoint, from a constitutional standpoint, I believe that what they've done is within the bounds of the Constitution, buttressed by the fact -- and I hear your point. But I think you, like me, believe that probably UC could have done this last year even without the pandemic.

And you're right, nobody knows what the interaction between the flu vaccine and the pandemic may be. We do know for sure that people who are vulnerable from a health perspective are more likely to get Covid 19.

And intuitively it seems to me that if someone has the flu it seems likely that you are more vulnerable to getting Covid 19.

And it also another interrelationship between the two. The symptoms are very similar. And it does seem to me that if somebody has a cough or the other

symptoms of either the flu or the Covid 19, if you haven't had the flu shot, you're going to wind up needing to take the test and be in isolation until you get the test results. And I know the time to get test results has been shortened, but it's -- still it can be fairly lengthy.

MR. JAFFE: Right.

I would point out, Judge, that Cindy Kiel pointed out -- she's in the administration. She pointed out that there's now a mandatory testing, Covid testing, once or twice a week, so they're going to know. I mean, if people are sick and they get the test and if it's not Covid, then it's the flu, so UC, to its credit, has put in rather stringent testing requirements for Covid.

So I don't think -- I think her point was that there really is no additional utilization required because of the testing. And it's a binary choice.

So I think -- I understand what you are saying. I think that really the issue is -- let me ask something. You don't think that -- you know, they have tried the hospital bed thing in Alabama; you know, these two in the Robinson case. You don't think that those cases suggest they would have to come with evidence that there's going to be a shortage of hospital beds? That didn't impress you, those two cases, the Alabama case?

It was abortion content.

THE COURT: I don't. And while I'm not supposed to do kind of ex parte research, I mean for some period of time before, I even got kind of involved in this case. I was tracking where and the extent to which Covid 19 cases were evolving. And the last time I looked, the predictions of some of the national medical experts that we are likely to hit a second wave clearly seems to be true.

Whether you look at the New York Times or Johns Hopkins or the CDC or the World Health, all of them show that for cases the curve today is above -- in the United States is above where it was in July.

MR. JAFFE: Oh, absolutely.

THE COURT: So the idea that we could run out of hospital beds seems plausible to me. I mean, I know that hasn't happened, and it seems that we didn't run out of ventilators mostly, but the idea that this health system would be overtaxed, that seems very credible to me.

I know from experience, I mean, other medical procedures quite often whether mandated, and I know at least somebody has mandated, that you can't have other medical procedures.

MR. JAFFE: Right.

THE COURT: But quite often hospitals just aren't in a position to do it. They want to keep those beds available. I don't know whether that's necessarily within California or near the UC campuses.

But the idea that we may be approaching a second wave and there may well be a shortage of hospital beds or other undue burdens on the health care facilities and staff, doctors, nurses, other health care professionals, that seems entirely plausible to me.

MR. JAFFE: Right. I certainly understand that.

Let me ask you this. You know, circling back, one thing you said about all the increases, you know, it seems to me that because of the second or maybe the third wave may be -- because of the third wave, what's happening is, you know, Government Newsom just issued his order that you can't even gather, you know, you have to be a three family limit. I don't know if you are familiar with that, Judge, you know, with this all going on in California.

THE COURT: -- county Superior Court.

MR. JAFFE: Well, that too.

But, you know, the irony is, and I think this is pointed out by Doctor Ornstein (ph), one of the defense experts, one of the reasons why Australia had a

light flu season was because people aren't going out and travel as much because of this Covid thing.

So while it's certainly true that there's this substantial --

THE COURT: Again, we probably need to stay in the record. But only last Saturday I had a Zoom call seated in this position with a couple I know well who are down in Melbourne, and they're going out to eat as much they want.

MR. JAFFE: Right.

THE COURT: Just Australia has had better restrictions. They had to go through a two week quarantine. I don't know that that really bears on this issue.

Again to me, my role is, as I said, kind of the outer guardrails to provide some check that in fact there isn't some violation of privacy or liberty that runs afoul of the constitutional protections which would only occur if there isn't a real relationship with a public health concern.

And again, it seems to me that there is -seems to me that UC took great care -- I mean, they knew
that among some people that this wouldn't be very
popular, or I assumed they knew that.

MR. JAFFE: Sure.

THE COURT: I think they assumed it was going to be a small fraction. I don't know. We may find out.

Again, totally apart from the legal issue, I think there might be some merit to having a personal belief exemption if it can somehow be tailored narrow enough so that people don't just say, hey, you know, I don't want to get the flu vaccine because that's not -- frankly, I wouldn't feel comfortable in a UC classroom sitting next to people who just said, you know, I don't want the flu vaccine.

And frankly, I was also effected -- Ms. Kiel's declaration, she said that at one point -- I'm trying to think exactly how she put it, but she wore -- working sick was almost a badge of honor. I get that. And there have been times when I was busy enough in law practice that I didn't have a choice.

But I was very mindful of people around me as she's changed it. She says she doesn't do that anymore. I've had people come to work sick. And generally I try to avoid it, and generally I worry about the extent to which people who do that or who don't get a flu vaccine are concerned about others.

MR. JAFFE: Right. Let me run two other things by you. And I don't know what Ms. Chun has to say.

THE COURT: She has to make some points.

MR. JAFFE: Well, she's -- you're making her points, so you know...

THE COURT: Well, the reason for that is I felt -- and look, both sides have well prepared papers, but she had papers that persuaded me. That's why I'm making her points. I have read both of your papers.

MR. JAFFE: I understand.

THE COURT: I just found her papers, particularly the expert declarations, more persuasive.

And by the way, we still haven't addressed why the Love versus State Board of Education case isn't controlling. Again, we've been kind of assuming that I have discretion. Frankly, on reading that case, it's not clear to me that I do.

MR. JAFFE: Right. I'll certainly look at that case. I'm not familiar -- I thought it was one of those four cases on the SB 277 thing.

THE COURT: It may well be. It cites the case that you refer to --

MR. JAFFE: Whitlow or Brown.

THE COURT: That's right.

MR. JAFFE: Yes. That was one of the four on SB 277 for children. And I understand your point. You don't see an operative difference between that.

Does it bother you -- let me just ask you a

question. Suppose Doctor Bottington (ph) went to talk to the Supreme -- the chief justice of the Supreme Court and says: You know what, this thing is working so well with the UC I would like all the court personnel in the state to get the shot. And the -- and the chief justice says: You know, I think that's a fine idea. Gives them all the declarations.

And all the sudden there's an order that everyone who comes into court, all the judges, right, they got to get the shot.

Now, maybe you already have the shot, you know. We don't need to know that. But I'm sure -- you've been around, you know, for a couple years on the bench, and I'm sure you know about your contrairs and all. And I would imagine given the fact that according to the CDC 57 percent of adults in California do not take the flu vaccine, or at least last year. Something like 63 percent the year before didn't take it.

So my view, with all due respect to myself, it's the majority position that most people in California do not take the flu shot for whatever reason, personal belief or what not.

I would imagine that some of your contrair, right, maybe the more colorful among them, would read this chief justice's order saying they got to get the

shot. And I can imagine that a more colorful one might even express some advice as to where the chief justice could go or some activity he could engage in.

In other words, they might be offended by the fact that his boss is going to make a condition of work or continuing in work, right, that they take the flu shot.

And I would suggest to you, you know, harkening back to something that you and I certainly remember, maybe -- Ms. Chun maybe if she's old enough, you know, Potter Stewart about, you know, obscenity, I know it when I see it. If you take a gut feeling of -- maybe not you, but some of your colleagues that you have lunch with, and that is -- that gut feeling, you know, I think expresses really the outrage that a substantial minority of this community feels, you know, about a personal violation for a compulsory medical procedure.

And we -- mindful of the fact that all of these cases, including I believe the case you cited, we do that to kids. Constitutionally, maybe there's a difference, maybe there isn't, but we just don't do that.

And you're going to be the first judge in the country that is going to allow that. And you know what that makes me? That makes me Fred Korematsu's lawyer

from the Korematsu case, right?

And I'm trying to explain -- I'm his criminal lawyer and I'm trying to tell the judge: This is a really bad idea because now it's the flu. Next it's going to be the meningitis vaccine or any vaccine they want for adults who haven't consented to it that are working and told they can't work anymore and unless they take the shot.

That's what this case is really about.

THE COURT: I hear you, and it's -- but once again, I'm not making the decision, in my view, as to whether on balance medically this is the better approach. The decision I'm making is whether the UC's decision is within constitutional bounds.

MR. JAFFE: I understand.

THE COURT: And I believe it is.

MR. JAFFE: Okay. And Judge, I've taken up too much of your time. I would like now Ms. Chun to explain to you why you are a hundred percent right.

THE COURT: That's fine.

Ms. Chun, feel free to differ with me. I may have missed something, some of the important points that were in your papers. I tried to capture them all.

MR. JAFFE: You did an excellent job, Judge, and just -- it's a credit to Ms. Chun's persuasiveness,

and I compliment and congratulate her.

MS. CHUN: Well, thank you. That's very gracious of you.

But I do think, your Honor, that -- you know, we are really grateful to you for taking the time to read all of the papers and to be so thoughtful with regards to your reasoning. And I believe, you know, we would be -- we would be happy to submit to the Court's tentative decision.

I do want to address some of the questions that you had raised as well as to address other points that Mr. Jaffe raised.

And you know, your Honor, we're very appreciative of the fact that you understand the fact that this case really is first and foremost about protecting the public health and safety of the UC community.

And I think especially given this inflection in time, this case is also really about leadership. When you pointed out that there were 21 -- you know, 20 leading universities that have also implemented a flu vaccine mandate for faculty and students and employees, my read of that, your Honor, is that these are the universities that took the care to look ahead to diligently prepare for the Covid 19 pandemic and for the

anticipated confluence of this flu season with this unprecedented and deadly pandemic.

And I can tell you that at the University of California we should be grateful with regards to the time and effort and care that they've put into since January with regards to how do we protect our employees, how do we protect students.

And your Honor got it right on the money. This is about protecting the entire community, especially the vulnerable on campus. It's not just about one individual or two individuals who don't take the vaccine.

And so your Honor, I believe that when you think about the points that your Honor made with regards to the law and what this Court can do, I totally agree with the Court that *Love* is very much controlling when asked us to address that.

And I think your Honor that the Love case and Brown and other similar cases about Senate Bill 277 and the fact that the California courts have unanimously found that the elimination of the personal exemption provision that used to exist with regards to the vaccination of students is constitutional. It is very much controlling here.

And your Honor, the reason why it's controlling

is not only with regards to the constitutional analysis
here. But I would, A, disagree with Mr. Jaffe. This

Court is not going to be the first court to determine

that adults should in fact for the interest of public

5 health be required to take vaccinations.

We cited, for instance, CF versus City of New York, and I believe that is 2019 West Law 1744, 748.

That was another case --

THE COURT: Ms. Chun, could you give me the page.

MS. CHUN: The citation, yes, sir. It's 2019 West Law 1744, 248 (sic) decided in April 2019.

That case, like this case, brought by the Children's Health Defense, which represents a number of antivaccine causes challenged the city of New York's decision and order to require mandatory MMR vaccinations among adults and children in certain zip codes. And the court in New York upheld that decision as constitutional.

Similarly, your Honor, we have a case closer to home, which Mr. Jaffe's reply secondarily cited, which we did not get an opportunity to respond to. The plaintiff's reply cited Scoff versus Regents (ph) with regards to the university and the Regents' constitutional authorities. That case cited a case

called Wallace V. Regents, First Appellate District decision. That citation is 75 Cal.App. 274, pin cite 278, decided in 1925.

In that case, your Honor, a gentleman by the name of Mr. Wallace, an adult who was admitted to the University of California was denied matriculation because he refused to comply with the vaccination requirements that the university had for small pox.

And your Honor, he filed for a writ petition, a writ of mandate, and the First Appellate District denied that writ decision. And it's a very short decision, three pages, but it's worth reviewing because I think, your Honor, that it will give you additional bolstered comfort like Love, like Brown, like these other cases that have been cited in our papers that hold that these sorts of vaccination requirements are indeed constitutional and are rationally related to the public health purpose.

In Wallace, the court there said that the University of California was in fact a unique constitutional entity that is very well within its rights to deny matriculation to Mr. Wallace for his refusal to take this small pox vaccine.

And your Honor, I think you made a very good point which neither party really made in our papers,

which is that the case for upholding the constitutionality of universities flu vaccine mandate is stronger because it is as to adults, as to adult employees and students.

And your Honor, you know, I think not only the fact that you pointed out, you know, children aren't really in a position to give informed consent, but here, your Honor, with regards to these adults, this is not a condition of employment, it is not a condition of enrollment.

It is, the Court correctly pointed out, only applicable to those people who are working or studying directly on campus because they are essential persons or because they have some sort of required lab.

This is the minority, your Honor, and so the actual numbers are persons who are on the ten UC campuses and the five medical facilities hover around 100,000 right now. It's probably less than 20 percent of what the normal University of California population would be.

And your Honor, so we think that on the case law, the Court has it right on the money with regards to the constitutionality.

And with regards to this suggestion that a personal exemption might be a good policy, which I

think, you know, the Court and Mr. Jaffe suggested Love and these other cases, I think they're witness to the fact that our legislators through Senate Bill 277 made the policy decision that personal exemption was dangerous and really deadly to California's population.

We had a personal exemption to the vaccination required that was required for school children, and that led to outbreaks of particular diseases that was really intolerable. And that's why the personal exemption exception was eliminated, and that decision by the legislature was consistently upheld.

And your Honor, I think that if we had a personal belief exemption here, given the unique circumstances of the university is facing with regards to the flu season and Covid 19, that would really put too many people to not avail themselves of the flu vaccine and it would lead to not only potentially flu disease but more serious flu related complications. It would increase the flu hospitalization incidents and could potentially leave to deaths.

And so, your Honor, I think that the university's decision to follow the California legislature's decision to eliminate the personal exemption exception in this case was something that was found that was really the responsible thing to do.

So I just want to address that because the Court was pondering a little bit about that.

Your Honor, with regards to South Korea, I don't know how much credence the Court gave to that, that is not in the record, but clearly --

THE COURT: When we moved outside of the record, both Mr. Jaffe and I, in a somewhat freewheeling discussion at times, we did get outside the record. I'm not going to put any weight on that.

MS. CHUN: Okay. Thank you, your Honor.

I would take the University of California's health and medical services over South Korea's any day. And so I just wanted to make sure that wasn't of anything to the Court.

Your Honor, with regards to the burden of proof, I think you again were correct with regards to the fact that it's the plaintiff who has the burden here. And in this particular instance, because this is a public health regulation by the university, that is actually the Court gave even greater deference and some of the cases that we cited in our papers discuss that.

I think that one case we cited, it's called Mallogy (ph) versus Regents has particularly helpful language about how university's public health regulations have the force of a statute. And when the

public health is at stake, that deference is even greater than normal burden of proof that the plaintiffs bear in a case like this when they are seeking the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction.

Your Honor, Mr. Jaffe made the comment that this was basically a program that was turning people into guinea pigs, and that is definitely not the case.

As your Honor pointed out, one thing that has been a little perplexing about this case is that as far as we can tell none of these plaintiffs have alleged that they are even subject to the exempt order. In fact, some of them, such as Professor Olson explicitly allege in their declarations that they are teaching remotely, that she has only been in her home since the spring. This is the Francis Olson declaration in support of these opposition at paragraphs three and six.

And as to the other students, the UC Santa Barbara students and the UCLA students, those campuses are engaged in remote learning right now. And so in the first instance, it's never even been clear to us that these particular plaintiffs have standing.

Ms. Kiel, whose concerns we take very seriously, she too is somebody who is not required to be on campus. Yolo County is currently under a government order where nonessential workers have to be working from

home due to the Covid 19 pandemic.

And so to the extent that anybody has a concern, there are not only medical exemptions, religious accommodations available, but the Court didn't mention at the outset that the university is also offering disability accommodations, which is broader than medical exemption.

And we have thus far received about 1100, 1200 such requests, and they are being processed. Any time Mr. Jaffe brought somebody to my attention who was having difficulty getting the paperwork processed, the university was very responsive in terms of making sure that that person got the paperwork that they needed and that the request was approved.

In fact, with Ms. Kiel, and this goes to the exhaustion point, your Honor, we had offered to, you know, provide her the paperwork so that she could put it in. And I understood from Mr. Jaffe that she didn't want to do it.

You know, the point being is there's no intention here and there's in fact no outcome of anybody being a guinea pig at all. And in fact, I think university's flu vaccine mandate was narrowly tailored, it was very thoughtfully created, and it reflects in fact something that the university was well within its

1 | rights to do.

THE COURT: Thank you.

I don't know if, Mr. Jaffe, do you have any -I think we've thoroughly aired the issues. I am going
to deny the motion for preliminary injunction. I'll
have Owe'll have an order out as soon as possible. I
don't think it will be too long.

But frankly, having gotten through the papers, and again, let me say, I mean the papers for both sides were very well prepared to me. It's a very interesting issue.

On the other hand, I'm sensitive of the fact that the executive order was to go into effect on November 1st and we're now November 5th.

So the injunction motion for preliminary injunction is denied now and again an order will follow shortly.

MR. JAFFE: Can I just --

MS. CHUN: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. JAFFE: Can I just point out a couple things just for the record, Judge?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. JAFFE: First, the New Yor case I'm familiar with, and there was a measles outbreak in New York, and the court ordered communities in zip codes to

1 | take the measles' shot.

But you know what they didn't do? They didn't order these people to take the flu shot because of a measles outbreak. That's what they didn't do.

And as I understand it now, there are only 100,000 people that are forced to work at the UC campus that have to take the flue shot out of 500,000, 100,00 that have to be on campus.

THE COURT: That's what I understood.

MR. JAFFE: Right.

MS. CHUN: It's not just workers, your Honor.

12 It's students who were either living on campus --

MR. JAFFE: Right.

MS. CHUN: -- studying on campus, or employees.

THE COURT: But the total number of people in the UC communities that are effected by the executive order is in the range of 100,000.

MS. CHUN: Yes. That's our best judgment.

MR. JAFFE: Plus anybody who has to come into the UC campus. Basically you can't come into the campus unless you get the shot.

THE COURT: You know, I've pondered that.

It seems to me that under the literal wording of the executive order and it seemed to me former

President Napolitano likely with the help of certain

medical and health care professionals and likely
lawyers, I think she actually used words like living,
working, or studying.

And as a result, somebody casually walking across the campus -- I mean, I certainly don't envision and I would expect Ms. Chun doesn't envision that there's going to be some sort of barricade, you know, around the campuses.

It's the people who are regularly there. You can't go to a classroom and study. You can't live in a dormitory. You can't -- if you are faculty, you can't go to your office without a flu shot.

You know, if the Federal Express guy is delivering a package to somebody, I don't think that's within the scope of the executive order.

Again, that's not really before me now.

MR. JAFFE: No, it's not.

THE COURT: But as I read the executive order, she tailored it to not just kind of a trespass concept, if you put your foot on UC property, it was more, if you did these activities which were more continuous on UC property, you needed to get this flu vaccine.

MR. JAFFE: Well, cutting off people's cards and -- they cutting off people's access cards and nurses are no longer being put on schedule without the flu

1 shot.

THE COURT: Well, but you assume that's because they're working, which is within --

MR. JAFFE: Right. If they're working on campus.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JAFFE: Right. But you can't go on campus without the flu shot. You're access card is not going to be -- is not going to be granted.

MS. CHUN: And the Court's understanding is correct. I mean, UC policy is actually narrower than, for instance, Johns Hopkins or other universities who have policies that extend to contractors. UC did not do that. So your Honor is correct.

MR. JAFFE: Actually, one of the guys who wanted to be a plaintiff was a contractor, so UC has sent out a policy to contractors at least at UC Davis Hospital saying all contractors have to be compliant with the order.

But I think that's a small point. It doesn't really matter. If they can do it for employees, then presumably they can do it for anybody who sits in the office. So I don't think that's a significant legal difference.

Judge, I understand your order. I greatly

appreciate your taking the time and the interest in the case.

THE COURT: Well, again, I greatly appreciate the briefs and the oral argument. Again, it's a very interesting case to me.

Ms. Chun, did you have something you wanted to add?

MS. CHUN: Yes, your Honor.

Just two quick little data points for the record and two housekeeping questions, your Honor.

So with regard to the hospital bed issue and the speculative second wave of Covid 19, unfortunately we are living in that second wave of Covid 19 now. We have recorded now more than 100,000 new Covid 19 cases per day in the United States unfortunately as we speak.

So one of the three things that

Mr. Jaffe's papers says is speculative has in fact come
home to roost.

With regard to hospital beds, as you can imagine with UC's hospitals, we are monitoring that condition day by day. We are anticipating not having hospital beds potentially in the Los Angeles area by January or February.

So this is not something which is simply mere speculation. These are actual facts which have been

informed the universities planning and way of thinking about how to prevent and mitigate against flu here on campus.

With regard to the housekeeping, first, the plaintiffs had moved ex parte for an order to show cause to hold the university in contempt.

We believe that that was baseless because there was no violation of this Court's order, let alone a willful violation. I just wanted to make sure that the Court was going to deny that application just for the record.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. CHUN: And then secondly, your Honor, the plaintiffs -- I'm sorry -- the defendants had filed objections to a number of the plaintiff's evidence including declarations that didn't have foundation, you know, were hearsay. There was one declaration that was filed without a signature and a subsequent one which was materially different was filed untimely.

Will the Court be issuing a ruling on the objections when you issue the written decision?

THE COURT: We will certainly comply with the Reid vs. Google requirements.

MS. CHUN: Okay. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: So we'll do whatever is required,

yes, which I would expect that the answer is yes.

MS. CHUN: Okay. Thank you.

MR. JAFFE: Judge, one other thing,
Ms. Chun talked about two more recent standards. She
seemed to suggest that the test was a rational
relationship. If we use it in more modern terminology,
obviously you're familiar with the tripartite test and
all.

I mean, if we're talking modern, there's no way. This is a fundamental right. Judge, you're allowing the University of California to inject people. This is a fundamental right of bodily integrity. There's no way any court is going to uphold this under rational relationship tests.

It's probably strict scrutiny, but if not, it's certainly intermediate scrutiny. So maybe you ought to clarify in light of Ms. Chun's argument. And I would --look, I'm an officer of the court too, and Judge, I have to tell you, I mean, I don't see -- we can talk about the Jacobson standard. But if we're talking about more modern parlance of the Constitution, I would strongly discourage you from making a ruling that the rational relationship test applies in this case. I think that is just an invitation to error.

I mean, you know, you argue strict scrutiny --

1 THE COURT: Pardon me, Mr. Jaffe. I think you 2 cited the Jacobson case in your complaint so. 3 MR. JAFFE: Correct. 4 THE COURT: Frankly, I largely decide cases 5 based on the positions that the parties take. I'll 6 consider your point and deal with it as I will. 7 And again, we'll get an order out shortly. 8 I -- hopefully we can get covered all of the additional 9 points and housekeeping issues again. 10 MR. JAFFE: We have, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Thank you. It's an interesting 12 case. But the motion will be denied. Thank you very 13 much. 14 MR. JAFFE: Thank you very judge. Thank you, your Honor. 15 MS. CHUN: 16 THE COURT: Bye bye. 17 MS. CHUN: Bye, bye. Thank you. 18 19 (Recess was taken at 4:22.) 20 21 --000--22 23 24 25

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